In the last two decades immense strides have been made in understanding the evolutionary foundations of morality. The evolutionary origins of biological altruism, social norms, normative guidance, and norm enforcement were once deep puzzles. Early models stressed genetic relatedness as driving "hard core," true altruism, while tit-for-tatlike reciprocation -which was ultimately conceived as a form of "selfishness" -explained helping behavior among non-kin.
cultural evolutionary selection pressures on morality by denying the latter: i.e., by claiming that our morality is not independently shaped by cultural evolutionary forces, or at least not so significantly so. And there is indeed a tendency in evolutionary accounts of our morality to see it as a pretty straightforwardly egalitarian project, rooted in natural selection.
30 Moreover Hayek's thesis that our conception of an acceptable morality has been shaped by group competition, in which "better" moralities (qua cultural traits) displaced less adaptive ones, is often adamantly resisted.
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Some things are, I think, quite clear at this point. Social or cultural evolution is a strong force on the evolution of norms, and it can lead to results that are crucially at odds with natural selection and biological adaptation. Indeed, as Richerson and Boyd bluntly put it, "culture is maladaptive." 32 Obvious examples of cultural norms opposed to biologically evolved, adaptive, inclinations abound, including the celibacy norm of the Catholic priesthood, which is directly opposed to, let us say, rather strong evolutionary dispositions (as is the norm of most of this essay's readers that places far more importance on the length of their CV than the size of their family).
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More importantly, there is sound reason to conclude that social evolutionary selection will systematically favor systems that do better on the Functional Desideratum.
Following Hayek, we can distinguish two loci of social selection, macro and micro. 34 At the macro level, "the selection process of evolution will operate on the order as a whole;" what is selected, Hayek argues, is an "order of actions" that arises from numerous interacting rules, other elements of the social system and the wider environment. 35 At the macro level selection pressures operate directly on "the order of actions of a group." 36 This distinction between a set of rules and the order of actions to which it gives rise is a fundamental insight of Hayek's, which allows us to distinguish in our analysis the focus of selective pressure from the underlying rules, which are transmitted. On Hayek's analysis, a group of individuals living under a set of social rules R, composed of rules {r1...rn}, will give rise to a certain abstract pattern of social interactions, O, on which macro selection operates. 37 Hayek advanced a rather strong emergentist relation between R and O, seeing R as a complex system with O as an emergent property. 38 We need not follow him quite that far. What is fundamental to the analysis is that a specific order OX is an abstract pattern of a large number of human interactions, which does not arise from any specific rule r, or the aggregated effects of a set of independent rules, but from a set of interacting rules in an environment E.
On Hayek's analysis macro social evolution is based on a form of group selection.
"The rules of conduct have … evolved because the groups who practiced them were more successful and displaced others." 39 Just what is meant by "group selection" is a vexed issue; models with very different dynamics are often categorized under this rather vague term. 40 Leaving nomenclature aside, a crucial claim is that if society S1, characterized by order of actions O1, is more productive than S2 based on O2, society S1 will tend to win conflicts with S2, a mechanism akin to natural selection. 41 But perhaps more importantly, the members of S2, seeing the better-off participants in S1 characterized by O1, may either immigrate to S1, or seek to copy its underlying rules, thus inducing differential rates of reproduction between the two sets of underling rules. 42 That aspect of our social morality that provides a technology of cooperation will be especially salient in such selection:
groups with more efficient cooperative schemes will tend to displace, or be copied by, competing groups. Insofar as the technology of cooperation is critical in determining group success, we can expect that social selection towards it will be strong.
Although in some statements Hayek seems to suggest that all selection occurs at this macro level, his more nuanced view is that, while the macro level is the primary locus of selection, rule selection also takes place in the form of competition between rules within a society. 43 For a rule r to be selected, it must be contributory to a selected order, O, but it must also attract allegiance within the group of individuals who coordinate via r.
Individuals are constantly testing rules to determine whether conformity suits their overall concerns; "it is, in fact, desirable that the rules should be observed only in most instances and that the individual should be able to transgress them when it seems to him worthwhile to incur the odium this will cause. … It is this flexibility of voluntary rules which in the field of morals makes gradual evolution and spontaneous growth possible, which allows further modifications and improvements." 44 Now as we have seen ( §3.1), group-beneficial rules can quickly spread within a group, and norms that improve the technology of social cooperation within the group are quintessential cases. So, once again, we should expect strong social selection pressures on the Functional Desideratum. However, here we confront a complexity. Although
Hayek himself disparaged rule selection based on how well a rule conformed to one's sentiments or moral ideals, 45 any plausible account of the selection of moral rules within a group must accord weight to how well those rules conform with the moral sense and judgment of the individuals composing the group. One of the factors that determine within-group fitness of a moral rule is its ability to secure allegiance and be taught to the next generation. This is a case of what Boyd and Richerson call "content bias": rules that accord with people's moral sensibilities are more apt to be learned and transmitted. 46 needlessly restrictive of the factors that affect cultural success and transmission. Thus we must acknowledge that there will be significant social selection pressure in favor of the Moral Sentiments Desideratum.
If this selection pressure is sufficiently strong, the rules favored within the group will cohere with the social sentiments, and Hayek's Worry will at least be mitigated. 47 If, however, the combined effects of macro and micro selection strongly favor the Functional Desideratum, and this swamps selection towards the Moral Sentiments Desideratum, Hayek's Worry will persist. Perhaps the most striking instance of this swamping was the rise of agricultural civilization. As we shall see, our egalitarian sentiments arose during the late Pleistocene era. This was generally a time of abrupt climatic variations; it was generally arid with high CO2 levels. 48 The current Holocene era, characterized by stable climates favorable to agriculture, arose around 10,000 years ago. Agriculture itself apparently was independently discovered about eight times, starting from from around 9,000 years ago. 49 One the great mysteries of cultural evolution was the extraordinarily rapid displacement over most of the world of smallscale egalitarian culture with agricultural-based, states and empires that were hierarchically organized. 50 This political development almost reversed, in the blink of an eye, the egalitarian culture in which humans evolved. 51 One hypothesis certainly seems compelling: that social evolution, especially macro evolution, strongly selected social norms on the Functional Desideratum, largely swamping the Moral Sentiments Desideratum.
The Rise of Egalitarian Hunters
In Distribution of the kill does not seem, as in the earlier case, determined by competition among the hunters (where we can suppose the more dominant took the best, first), but by a designated cutter allocating shares of the kill. To be a bit more speculative, it looks as if the socialized primate carnivores of 400,000 years ago were becoming egalitarian hunters by 200,000 years ago. It is very difficult not to conclude that egalitarian sentiments had already taken root by this period. Thus the earlier conclusion: assuming modern humans had appeared by 45,000-40,000 years ago, there were 6-8,000 generations for egalitarian sentiments to evolve from what we can infer was their first appearance, somewhere between 250,000 and 200,000 years ago.
We have good reason to conclude that modern, late-Pleistocene, humans lived in groups between 25 and 150, 56 obtained a high percentage of their calories from hunting or fishing, and engaged in egalitarian meat sharing. If, however, we wish to make much richer inferences about their social organization we must make an additional assumption:
that some contemporary hunter-forager societies approximate the social orders characteristic of the late-Pleistocene era. In his important study of contemporary latePleistocene-appropriate ("LPA") foraging societies, Boehm eliminated from consideration societies that have been heavily influenced by Western and market societies, those with some agriculture, those that trade with agricultural groups, those that rely on domesticated horses, and so on, ultimately identifying 150 (of which a third have been more minutely analyzed) contemporary forger societies whose way of life corresponds to what we know of late-Pleistocene hunter-gatherer bands. The critical assumption is that detailed analysis of these LPA societies allow us to make inferences about the social norms and core social concerns of our late-Pleistocene ancestors. 57 This assumption is certainly not uncontroversial. Contemporary LPA-foraging societies exist in the Holocene era of milder climates and arguably greater ease, or at least less uncertainty, in obtaining food. In the harsh late-Pleistocene climate, it could well have been far less rare for groups to have faced such dire circumstances that sharing broke down, leading to the group splintering into family-sized, rather than band-sized units, with very different evolutionary dynamics. 58 Nevertheless, the social organization of these societies corresponds to much of what we know about late-Pleistocene bandsthey are mobile, stress sharing rather than storing meat, combine hunting with foraging and live in core bands of 20 to 30 persons. 59 With care, we can draw useful inferences from the organization of LPA societies to form a richer idea of life in the sorts of bands in which humans evolved.
The Egalitarian Ethos of LPA Societies
A central feature of LPA societies is certainly equalized meat sharing. In these societies meat is typically a highly prized and precious good, the distribution of which has great impact on the well-being of members. In some groups and in some cooperative activities, something like strict equality holds; however departures from equality are also observed (for example kin-bias, on the basis of past behavior, and so on) as well as work effort. 60 It is plausible to understand egalitarian sharing norms as having two core social functions.
First, and most obviously, they serve a means of variance reduction in food intake.
Hunting is a rather hit and miss affair; sometimes hunters come home with more than enough, other times not quite enough, and other times nothing at all. Managing this variance is a general problem for all carnivores -other social carnivores typically handle it through dominance hierarchies; those at the top leave meat for others after taking their share. Only in humans, however, does variation reduction take place via equalization. 61 It may well be that the second function is critical here: suppression of assertions of dominance. As Boehm describes them, the truly fundamental feature of LPA societies is resolute and sustained suppression of would-be dominant members, and this most definitely includes would-be dominant hunters. Nomadic forgers, Boehm concludes, are universally "and all but obsessively" concerned with resisting would-be dominators and bullies. Thus, he concludes, forgers are not concerned with absolute equality of outcomes, but equalization of shares as a way of resisting all attempts by would-be dominant members to push them into a subordinate role. 62 "Minimally, this means that all the active hunters (generally the adult males) insist in being seen as equal and that among themselves they tolerate no serious domination -be this in hogging vital food resources or in bossing others around." As another member of the group says:
When a young man kills much meat, he comes to think of himself as a chief or a big man, and he thinks of the rest of us as his servants or his inferiors. We can't accept that. We refuse one who boasts, for someday his pride will make him kill somebody. So we always speak as if his meat is worthless. In this way we cool his heart and make him gentle. 64 As Boehm conceives of it, the egalitarian ethos constitutes a "reverse dominance hierarchy" -the rest of the group acts to subordinate would-be alpha bullies. 65 Those who cannot control their dominating tendencies are subjected to a scale of increasing sanctions, from criticism, to ridicule to ignoring their "orders." And if that is not enough to control would be bosses, Ostracism (taken in a restricted sense as the silent treatment) is one way of putting a deviant on notice, and at the same time of gaining enough distance so that others can be insulated from the aberrant behaviors .... mild ostracism can allow a political upstart to stay with the group, hopefully to experience some behavioral modifications and gain social reentry.
Permanent expulsion from the group, or the group's quietly moving way, carries the distancing still further and suggests that redemption possibilities have been set aside. 66 And, as a last resort, would-be bullies have been executed by either the entire group, or selected members. 67 However, it would be a great mistake to suppose that would-be authoritarians are simply held in check by external sanctions. As Darwin suggested, a definitive development in the moral sense of humans was the development of conscience or, more accurately, internalized normative guidance. 68 Individuals do not only see the rules of morality as external guidelines as to how they are expected to behave, they adopt the guidelines as internal demands they make upon themselves, and feel guilt and shame when they fail to conform. Indeed, unless a creature can regulate his behavior through internalized prescriptions addressed to himself, it is doubtful that we would say that he is a moral agent. 69 A plausible interpretation of the report the !Kung hunter is that he had internalized the norms of over-modesty about his kill, such that he policed his own behavior.
LPA Egalitarianism and Freedom
If we think back to our initial puzzle -how did a primate species, with its strong tendencies to hierarchy and dominance evolve into an egalitarian, cooperative, species? -things are now a bit clearer. It is not as if humans were once a hierarchical, dominance-submission-inclined primate and were transformed into an egalitarian species: our egalitarianism appears to be best understood as a direct control mechanism, where the rest of the group seeks to neutralize would-be dominators. 70 But, then we see, as ethnographers such as Boehm and Lee have argued, that the egalitarian ethos is not at bottom a "collectivist" ethic of the group subordinating the individual, but one in which the group subordinates those individuals who would control others. As Lee observed:
Egalitarianism is not simply the absence of a headman and other authority figures, but a positive insistence on the essential equality of all people and a refusal to bow to the authority of others, a sentiment expressed in the statement: "...each of us is headman over himself."
Leaders do exist, but their influence is subtle and indirect. They never order or make demands of others, and their accumulation of material goods is never more, and often much less, than the average accumulation of the other households in the camp. 71 We thus arrive at Boehm's important hypothesis about LPA societies:
...such people are guided by a love of personal freedom. For that reason they manage to make egalitarianism happen, and do so in spite of competitiveness -in spite of human tendencies to dominance and submission that easily lead to the formation of social dominance hierarchies.
People can arrest this process by reacting collectively, often preemptively, to curb individuals who show signs of wanting to dominate their fellows. Their reaction involves fear (of domination), angry defiance, and a collective commitment to dominate, which is based on a fear of being individually dominated. 72 Thus, in Boehm's view, LPA societies are characterized by a near-obsession of resisting the authority of would-be dominators. Indeed, it is widely recognized by ethnographers that forger societies tend to put great stress on preserving personal autonomy. 73 
LPA Egalitarianism is No Camping Trip
The "egalitarian ethos" examined by ethnographers is not the same as the ideal popularized by G. A. Cohen under the same moniker. In his final little pamphlet, Why Not Socialism? Cohen sketched his egalitarian ideal in terms of a camping trip, in which all cooperate for the common good. There are interesting similarities, and fundamental differences, between LPA egalitarianism and Cohen's campers.
You are I and a whole bunch of other people go on a camping trip. There is no hierarchy among us, our common aim is that each of us should have a good time doing, as far as possible, the things he or she likes the best .... We have facilities with which to carry out our enterprise .... And, as usual on camping trips, we avail ourselves of those facilities collectively; even if they are privately owned things, they are under collective control ....
In these contexts most people, even the most anti-egalitarian, accept, indeed, take for granted, norms of equality and reciprocity. So deeply do most people take these norms for the game is played in the relentlessly "selfish" way, as The Machiguenga are essentially without markets; the Mapuche have limited acquaintance with markets. Note that "egalitarian" play in the Ultimatum Game seems characteristic of market, but not non-market, societies. A plausible hypothesis is that egalitarianism is less often expressed as a generalized taste for an equal distribution than as a moral norm of fair dealing. The Machiguenga, for example, do not seem to have norms regulating anonymous transactions with strangers, and thus do not see anything unfair about "selfish" Proposer offers.
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It is, then, plausible to conclude that abstract rule-based behavior is far more consistent with the Moral Sentiments Desideratum than Hayek supposed. Recall that
Hayek underestimated the importance of micro-selection in the evolution of social rules on the basis of whether the rules are attractive to the sentiments of those whose behavior is to be guided by them ( §3.2). And it is here that we should expect our egalitarian sentiments to have considerable influence: while macro selection will focus on the Functional Desideratum, within the group rules and norms will tend to be selected that not only increase in-group benefits, but that cohere with the consciences of participants.
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The overall system of moral rules will, on this view, be a vector of both selection pressures. To be sure, macro could swamp the micro, but there is no reason to suppose that the core of the problem is an inevitable conflict between the social evolution of rules and egalitarianism's direct pursuit of material equality, for it is not material equality that is at the heart of the egalitarian ethos.
Markets, Freedom, and Equality
If our fundamental sentiments were formed over a 200,000 year Cohen-like camping trip, then indeed we might well be worried that they are in fundamental tension with largescale market orders (that is, the Traditional Collectivist View may be the best understanding of our egalitarian nature). Market orders, Cohen stresses, treat people instrumentally as means to the satisfaction of a person's ends and put great emphasis on the "right to make personal choices, even if the result is inequality and/or instrumental treatment of people." 87 We should, I think, resist this conception of markets as simply treating others "instrumentally." Market relations are embedded in a system of norms, which relies on our innate ability to be guided by norms and imperatives. 88 To treat people purely instrumentally would be to prefer to play "snatch" rather than "exchange" with them -I would prefer to snatch and run rather than exchange my good for theirs.
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However, as Richerson and Boyd stress, we have evolved -through both biological and cultural evolution -to be rule-following conditional cooperators. 90 "Conditional cooperation and the existence of social rules, to which we more or less readily conform, constitute the moral hidden hand." 91 Market exchange is embedded in a system of norms that conform to demands of fairness.
Because we are primates that did not evolve on the camping trip, our cooperative sentiments are always mixed with a large dose of concern for self. "Humans have evolved a social psychology that mixes a strong element of cooperative dispositions ...
with an equally strong selfish element deriving from our more ancient primate dispositions." 92 As we have seen, LPA foragers are not wholeheartedly communal creatures involved in a communal project: they are individualists, deeply sensitive to their status, who collectively resist the attempts by some to boss them around. And because of this, we have seen ( §4.4), the egalitarian sentiments focus first and foremost on resisting hierarchy and maintaining personal autonomy. As Boehm stresses, the fundamental concern is that of an individual that he not be subordinated to the would-be boss, and he enlists the group in helping to secure his equal status.
Market relations suit conditionally cooperative creatures, ready to follow rules and insisting on fair treatment while also benefiting themselves. As we better understand the culture of markets, I believe, we will find no stark opposition between it and the true egalitarian ethos. 93 To be sure extreme disparities in outcomes may well cause alarm bells to ring; when others are many, many times richer than you, the threat of being bossed and dominated is real. Classic and contemporary "republicans" have a genuine insight; personal autonomy can be endangered by extreme inequalities.
say that freedom requires the will-o'-wisp of equal power, and it certainly does not mean that the state and the law are not themselves threats to autonomy. But classical liberals
should not delude themselves that there can never be sensible reservations about Paretean gains in wealth or income.
The Firm and Hierarchies
As I read the evolutionary evidence, market relations are not themselves in tension with the egalitarian ethos. The feature of modern capitalism that seems deeply at odds with this ethos is the great hierarchical organization that populates market societies: the firm.
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As Coase taught us, firms are not mini-markets; they are islands of hierarchy in a sea of conditional cooperation among autonomous agents. 96 Whereas market exchange is regulated by contracts between independent parties who cooperate through the price mechanism, firms are organized hierarchically, the role of contract is much reduced, and the price mechanism does not regulate the internal coordination of the firm. As Coase understood it, the "master and servant" relation is fundamental to the firm. This authority relation, Coase argued, reduces transaction costs. Transactions organized through the price mechanism entail negotiating costs; the firm is a way to decrease these costs in some circumstances. In this sense the hierarchical firm is efficient, but it is based on hierarchy and bosses.
John Stuart Mill expressed the unease that many liberals feel about the hierarchical firm. In an important passage, Mill writes:
if public spirit, generous sentiments, or "true" justice and equality are desired, association, not isolation, of interests, is the school in which these excellences are nurtured. The aim of improvement should be not solely to place human beings in a condition in which they will be able to do without one another, but to enable them to work with or for one another in relations not involving dependence. Hitherto there has been no alternative for those who lived by their labour, but that of labouring either each for himself alone, or for a master. But the civilizing and improving influences of association, and the efficiency and economy of production on a large scale, may be obtained without dividing the producers into two parties with hostile interests and feelings, the many who do the work being mere servants under the command of the one who supplies the funds, and having no interest of their own in the enterprise except to earn their wages with as little labour as possible….
[T]here can be little doubt that the status of hired labourers will gradually tend to confine itself to the description of workpeople whose low moral qualities render them unfit for anything more independent: and that the relation of masters and workpeople will be gradually superseded by partnership, in one of two forms: in some cases, association of the labourers with the capitalist; in others, and perhaps finally in all, association of labourers among themselves.
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Notice how Mill stresses that the value of non-dependence, which is so central to the egalitarian ethos, is undermined by the hierarchical, capitalist, firm.
Hayek's Worry thus cannot be entirely assuaged. The critical problem is not, however, that rule-based market orders are opposed to "atavistic" egalitarian sentiments, but that the values of conditional cooperation among autonomous persons within a framework of rules that prevent bullying -values at the core of the egalitarian ethos and the market -sit uneasily with the values on which the hierarchical firm rests. Indeed, as
Hayek suggested, there is something distinctively socialistic in the character of the hierarchical firm: plans are devised, participants are often ordered to do their part, and are rewarded according the judgments of superiors as to the worth of their effort and contribution. 98 Organization through this bossy device has done very well on the Functional Desideratum for a long span of time. To be sure, some are always attracted to bossing (as they are to politics) and some to be being bossed; the majority, though, are apt to feel some resentment of life as servants. Since the dawn of agriculture the demands of efficient hierarchical organization have run counter the core elements of the egalitarian ethos. Mill's prediction that these organizational forms would be displaced by less hierarchical ones proved, at best premature; whether recent, more collaborative, forms of enterprise organization turn out to be developments that occupy only a well-defined niche in certain highly innovative fields, or whether they expand to a more wide-ranging role, may help determine whether our egalitarian sentiments will better cohere with the norms of our innovative and wealthy societies. 99 despite our best efforts to gain mastery over them, we are still under the thumbs of the political alpha class; we cycle among finding this efficient, outrageous, and comforting.
Hayek was entirely right to stress our ambivalent nature, 100 but I believe he was manifestly wrong -as, interestingly, are many contemporary socialists -that our deepest evolved sentiments oppose life under fair rules among independent, conditional, cooperators who insist on their equal status. On this fundamental matter, we are not nearly so deeply ambivalent as many have supposed.
However, while a social morality fundamentally opposed to our egalitarian sentiments may well be unjustifiable to us, we must remember that these egalitarian sentiments are just one part of most people's overall normative perspective, and as we have seen, it is stronger in some than in others. Hierarchies, both commercial and political, can certainly be justified (think of the Functional Desideratum), as can be innumerable social norms that allow various types of inequalities. It is certainly a mistake, as some socialists are wont to think, that a society conforming to a relatively specific egalitarian ethos is the ideal for twenty-first century humanity. A political philosophy that truly takes the egalitarian ethos to heart is one that itself does not claim a bullying authority over others -even one that insists that they be egalitarians -but which respects all as free and equal persons, who make their own trade-offs between the many sentiments and values that can comprise satisfying lives for our diverse species. 40 While the importance of forms of multi-level selection in biological evolution is still hotly disputed, I think there is conclusive reason to view multi-level selection as fundamental in cultural evolution.
Philosophy University of Arizona

